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Abstract
We develop a search model in which some employers hold unobservable racial preju-
dice towards black workers. Prejudiced employers may refuse to hire and may terminate
black workers based on their prejudice. Workers do not observe employer prejudice,
but they observe the race of their potential supervisor at the firm, which serves as a
signal of the employer’s prejudice. Jobs in firms with black supervisors hold higher
option value for black workers, because they are less likely to face prejudice-based ter-
mination. Hence, black workers are willing to accept employment with lower expected
match quality from firms with black supervisors. We derive theoretical predictions on
differences in observed wages and job stability across supervisor race and prejudice lev-
els. We find empirical support for our predictions using a unique longitudinal dataset
with information on the worker’s supervisor race matched with state-level measures of
prejudice.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we develop a new job search model in which black workers respond to im-
perfect signals of employer prejudice in the local labor market. We test the theoretical
predictions from the model using a unique dataset on local prejudice levels and supervisor’s
race and provide a new explanation for the observed black-white differences in wages and
unemployment in the U.S.1 Our work builds on the taste-based discrimination framework
that dates to Becker (1971). In Becker’s seminal work, prejudiced employers dislike hiring
black workers, and to offset their utility loss, they are only willing to hire black workers at a
lower wage than whites. However, in a perfectly competitive labor market, prejudice does not
cause long-run wage differentials, provided that there are enough unprejudiced employers in
the labor market to offer employment to black workers. Instead, as emphasized by Arrow
(1972), employment will be segregated, but there will be no long-run wage discrimination as
unprejudiced firms enter and growing demand for black workers eliminates wage differentials.
Subsequent research have shown, however, that wage differentials can persist when there
are search frictions (e.g., Black 1995, Bowlus and Eckstein 2002, Rosen 1997). A common
prediction from these search models is that the existence of prejudiced employers lowers
the arrival rate of job offers to blacks. Because search is costly, black workers are willing
to set a lower reservation wage or match quality for accepting employment. The search
framework can also facilitate predictions about employment differences between black and
white workers. Compared to wage differentials, much less attention has been paid to racial
gaps in employment, despite the fact that the size of the unexplained employment gap is
substantially larger (e.g., Stratton 1993, Johnson and Neal 1998, Ritter and Taylor 2011;
Lang and Lehmann 2012). The existence of large, unexplained black-white differentials in
employment suggests that disentangling the factors behind racially varying frictions in job
search is important for a better understanding racial inequalities in the labor market.
We begin with a random search model in which some employers hold prejudice towards
black workers and workers face two sources of information friction: a job-specific match
quality and employer prejudice. Productivity on the job is initially uncertain to both worker
and firm. Upon matching, they receive a signal of the true productivity, and workers are
paid their expected product until the uncertainty is resolved. After one period on the job,
match quality is revealed, and if the match is poor, it is terminated and the worker returns
1Racial disparities in the U.S. labor market are well-documented. In the 2000s, year-round full-time
employed black men earned less than 80% of that earned by white men and faced more than double the
rate of unemployment (Lang and Lehmann, 2012). A substantial portion of this wage gap can be attributed
to differences in skill (Neal and Johnson, 1996), yet a sizable wage gap still remains even accounting for
observable differences in education and cognitive test scores especially among low-skill workers (e.g., Carneiro,
Heckman, and Masterov 2005, Lang and Manove 2011, Bjerk 2006, and Black et al. 2006).
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to unemployment. An employer’s prejudice manifests itself in two ways. First, similar to
Black (1995), prejudiced firms may sometimes refuse to offer employment to blacks upon
matching. Second, prejudiced firms may arbitrarily fire black employees after each period
of employment.2 When workers meet an employer during job search, they cannot observe
whether the employer is prejudiced or not.3 However, they observe the race of their potential
supervisor at the firm. The presence of black supervisors serves as an informative signal that
the employer lacks prejudice. Because black workers have greater confidence that they will
not be arbitrarily terminated after the job-match quality is revealed, blacks are willing to
accept lower wages from firms with black supervisors. In other words, jobs from unprejudiced
firms provide black workers with a greater option value; if the job is revealed to be a better
match than the worker had initially expected, he or she will not lose future wage benefits as
a result of an arbitrary, prejudice-based termination.
Our model produces several new empirically testable predictions about wage and em-
ployment differentials between black and white workers across supervisor race and prejudice
levels. First, black workers will have lower average wages in jobs with a black supervi-
sor. However, they will be compensated for lower wages by longer employment spells. In
other words, although black workers are willing to accept “riskier” jobs with worse signals
of match quality from firms with black supervisors, the jobs they accept will provide them
with a lower expected termination risk (i.e., greater option value). Second, as the proportion
of prejudiced employers increases in the local labor market, the expected termination risk
from employers without black supervisors increases and the wage and job stability effects are
magnified. Our model predicts that as prejudice levels rise in the local labor market, black
workers in jobs with black supervisors’ wages will decrease both absolutely and relative to
their wages in jobs with white supervisors, and their job stability will decrease absolutely.
We test our theoretical predictions using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997
cohort (NLSY97) and the General Social Survey (GSS). Using the confidential geocode vari-
ables for both datasets, we construct the rate at which people report prejudiced beliefs by
state and match these measures of prejudice to workers in the NLSY97 living in these states.
The NLSY97 provides data on supervisor’s race for most of the panel, allowing us to exam-
2In our model, arbitrary termination is determined by a random draw. However, termination can be
thought of as either the employer learning about how much animus he holds towards the worker or the
employer acting on his prejudiced views to the fullest extent possible without facing legal repercussions.
3In a standard taste-based discrimination model, prejudiced firms do not make offers to black workers,
so they know with full confidence that their potential employer is not prejudiced. However, there are many
reasons to think that a job offer does not preclude a black worker from facing prejudice on the job. For
example, the hiring officer may be unprejudiced, but the supervisor may be prejudiced. Implicit Association
Tests have also shown that many individuals who do not believe they are prejudiced may still possess
subconscious prejudices which may impact the employment relationship. See, for example, Ziegert and
Hanges (2005), Bertrand, Chugh and Mullainathan (2005), and Rooth (2007).
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ine wages and employment patterns for black and white workers across jobs with different
supervisor races or perceived prejudice.
Likely due to lack of data, there exists only limited research on the impact of prejudice
levels or employer/supervisor’s race on labor market outcomes. Closely related to our work
is that of Charles and Guryan (2008) in which they test the predictions of the canonical
Becker model. Using measures of prejudice from the GSS, they find empirical support for
the prediction that the prejudice levels of the “marginally prejudiced” firm in the state can
explain wage differences between black and white workers.4 Fadlon (2015) uses the NLSY97
to test a model of statistical discrimination in which black employers observe black workers’
skill levels with better accuracy than white employers. To support this he finds that the
correlation between wage and skills is stronger for workers who have a same race supervisor.
Finally, using personnel data from a single firm, Giuliano et. al (2009, 2011) show that black
managers disproportionately hire blacks relative to managers of other races, and that black
workers under black managers have better career trajectories.
Our work differs in many important aspects from these papers. First, our model focuses
on imperfect information on employer prejudice. Second, rather than equate supervisor’s race
with that of the hiring officer, we assume that the presence of a black supervisor provides a
signal of the prejudice a worker may face on the job. Third, all employers observe the match
quality signal of workers with equal precision. Finally, our model yields unique predictions
about racial differentials in wages and job stability across employers and labor markets with
varying levels of prejudice.
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model of search
with unobservable employer prejudice and derive our main predictions. We describe the data
in Section 3 and present results from our empirical tests in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model of Search and Racial Matches in Employment
In this section we outline a simple model to illustrate our ideas formally and to motivate our
empirical work. Prejudice will have two negative repercussions on black workers. Prejudiced
employers do not always make job offers to black workers, which decreases the arrival rate of
jobs and makes black workers less selective in accepting employment than whites. Prejudiced
employers also terminate black workers at higher rates, but black workers cannot observe
which employers are prejudiced. They do observe the race of a supervisor, and prejudiced
4Charles and Guryan (2011) extends this analysis by showing that, despite decreases in the average level
of prejudice in the U.S. over the past half-century, there has been little change in the level of prejudice held
by the marginally prejudiced individuals who are most likely to interact with blacks given the segregation
implied by Becker’s model.
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firms do not employ black supervisors. Thus, black workers anticipate a higher chance of
termination from a white supervisor firm. As a consequence, black workers are more selective
on jobs they accept from white supervisor firms than black supervisor firms. The higher
perceived termination risk decreases the option value of employment at white supervisor
firms. Our theoretical model formalizes this intuition.
2.1 Primitives
We begin with a three-period model. Workers differ in their race but are otherwise identical.
They are risk-neutral and do not discount the future. We outline the timing of our model
graphically in Figure 1. All workers begin unemployed. In each period, unemployed workers
earn h and are randomly matched with a firm (period 1). If that firm offers them a job and
the worker accepts, they transition to employment with that firm in the next period (period
2). A worker’s productivity on the job depends only on his job match quality, which is either
good or bad. Workers are paid their expected marginal product.5 In good matches, workers
produce ω > h > 0, while in bad matches, workers produce 0.6 Upon matching, workers and
firms observe a signal q which represents the probability that the match will be good. This
signal is distributed uniformly over [0, 1], which ensures that any results at the reservation
wages hold for the average wages. In Appendix A.2, we describe the conditions under which
our predictions hold for a more general distribution.7
After one period of employment, both the firm and the worker learn the quality of the
match. If the match is bad, the worker quits and transitions to unemployment in the next
period (period 3). Otherwise he remains employed at the firm and earns ω.8 A worker is
either white (w) or black (b). Some firms possess prejudice against black workers, and the
prejudice manifests itself in two ways. First, prejudiced firms may choose not to make a
wage offer to black workers upon meeting them. Second, prejudiced firms may arbitrarily
terminate the employment relationship after each period.
5This wage setting mechanism greatly eases exposition and is commonly imposed on models with search
frictions and evolving information about productivity. See, for example, Fryer Jr., Pager, and Spenkuch
(2013). Jovanovic (1979) shows that this is one (of many) wage equilibrium is such models. All of our results
would follow if wages were set by a non-cooperative two-stage alternating offer bargaining game. These
results are available upon request.
6This ensures that workers do not prefer jobs with bad match quality to unemployment.
7In particular, all of our results except for Proposition 3 hold for any log-concave distribution.
8As jobs which are accepted in period 2 begin in period 3, the quality of the match is never learned.
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2.2 White Workers
We first analyze the behavior of white workers. As whites do not face prejudice, they act as
our baseline against which we can compare the impact of prejudice on black workers. Working
backwards, an unemployed worker in period 3 receives h, the value of home production, while
an employed worker with probability q of being a good match earns qω. It then follows that
the worker will accept any offer for period 3 employment with a match quality greater than
qrw3 , where
qrw3 =
h
ω
. (1)
The superscript rw denotes the reservation wage for white workers, and the subscript number
denotes the period in which employment begins.
Unemployed white workers receive employment offers with probability 1. Thus, their
value of unemployment in period 2 is
Uw2 = h + ω [1− F (q
rw
3 )]E(q|q ≥ q
rw
3 ) + F (q
rw
3 )h (2)
where F (q) is the cumulative distribution function of match probabilities. Substituting for
qrw3 and applying the uniform distribution assumption to F ,
Uw2 = h+ ω(1−
h
ω
)
1 + h
ω
2
+
h
ω
h
= h+
ω2 + h2
2ω
(3)
An employed worker in period 2 receives his expected product. In period 3, he receives
ω if the match is good, which occurs with probability q. If the match is revealed to be bad
he returns to unemployment and earns h. Therefore, the value of employment in period 2
with a match quality signal q is
V w2 (q) = qω + qω + (1− q)h
= 2qω + (1− q)h. (4)
Finally, in the first period, white workers will accept offers only when V w2 (q) ≥ U
w
2 . This
occurs when
q >
ω2 + h2
2ω(2ω − h)
≡ qrw2 (5)
which represents the zero prejudice baseline reservation match quality signal.
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2.3 Black Workers
We now turn to the strategy of black workers. A fraction p ∈ (0, 1) of firms possess prejudice
against black workers. With probability s ∈ (0, 1), a prejudiced firm will refuse to make a
wage offer to a black worker upon matching.9 In addition, a prejudiced firm will terminate
the employment of a black worker with probability s after each period. Thus, on average,
black workers have a lower chance of receiving job offers when unemployed and have lower
option value from job offers from prejudiced firms. Workers do not observe whether a firm is
prejudiced when they meet. However, they do observe the race of their supervisor at the firm,
which acts as a signal of a firm’s prejudice; firms with black supervisors are unprejudiced
with certainty.10 A fraction b ∈ (0, 1) of non-prejudiced firms have black supervisors.
We again work backwards. Just as with white workers, black workers receive h when
unemployed in period 3 and qω when employed in a job with probability q of being a good
match. Thus, they follow an identical reservation q strategy,
qrb3 =
h
ω
. (6)
Prejudice does not enter this decision, because a worker’s life ends after period 3. Conditional
on receiving an offer, the threat of termination does not matter as there is no period 4.
This is not the case in period 2. With probability p, black workers will encounter a prej-
udiced firm, and with probability s, a prejudiced firm will refuse to offer them employment.11
Thus, the value of unemployment is
U b2 = h+ ω(1− ps)
[
1− F (qrb3 )
]
E(q|q ≥ qrb3 ) +
[
ps + (1− ps)F (qrb3 )
]
h (7)
Applying the uniform distribution and substituting for qrb3 , the value of unemployment in
period 2 simplifies to
U b2 = h + ω(1− ps)(1−
h
ω
)
1 + h
ω
2
+
[
ps+ (1− ps)
h
ω
]
h
= (1 + ps)h+
(1− ps)(ω2 + h2)
2ω
. (8)
9We note that it is not necessary for our results for prejudiced firms to sometimes refuse to make offers to
black workers. This modeling feature is simply for realism and keeping in line with previous search models
of prejudice. In the absence of this, an increase in prejudice causes a decrease in the value of unemployment
for black workers by decreasing the value of all job offers from white supervisor firms, and the results then
all carry through.
10Our results hold so long as firms with black supervisors are less likely to be prejudiced than those with
white supervisors.
11Note that supervisor race does not matter for jobs offered at this stage, as workers are unconcerned
about future termination risk due to the finiteness of the model.
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As ω
2+h2
2ω
> h, black workers have a lower value of period 2 unemployment than white
workers, which is a direct implication of the ps probability that they will not receive a job
offer.
Prejudice also causes black workers to differentially value job offers from supervisors with
different races. As a black supervisor acts as a perfect signal of non-prejudice, these jobs pose
no involuntary termination risk. Black workers with black supervisors earn their expected
product in period 2 and have a q probability of earning ω in period 3. With probability
1− q, the job is not a good match, and they return to unemployment in period 3 and receive
h. Thus, the value of a job offer from a black supervisor firm is
V bb2 (q) = qω + qω + (1− q)h
= 2qω + (1− q)h (9)
where the superscript refers to the value to black workers of a black supervisor job. Note
that conditional on q, the value function is identical to that of white workers. Both white
workers and black workers with black supervisors experience no prejudice-based termination
risk. In period 1, if black workers receive a job offer from a black supervisor firm, they will
accept if and only if V bb2 (q) ≥ U
b
2 , which occurs when
q ≥
psh
(2ω − h)
+
(1− ps)(ω2 + h2)
2ω(2ω − h)
≡ qrbb2 (10)
where qrbb2 represents the black worker reservation match probability for black supervisor
jobs that begin in period 2. Despite valuing jobs identically conditional on q, black workers
are less selective in the offers they accept from black supervisors than white workers, because
they have a lower value of unemployment.
This is not the case for job offers from white supervisor firms. A fraction π of job offers
from white supervisor firms come from prejudiced employers, where
π ≡
p(1− s)
(1− b)(1 − p) + p(1− s)
. (11)
This expression is simply derived from Bayes’ rule where the denominator is the fraction of
firms with white supervisors who will offer employment to a black worker: all unprejudiced
firms and a fraction (1 − s) of prejudiced firms. Black workers with white supervisors earn
their expected product in period 2, and with probability q learn the job is a good match in
period 3. However, with probability π their employer is prejudiced, and prejudiced employers
terminate black employees regardless of match quality with probability s. Thus, the expected
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value of these jobs is
V bw2 (q) = qω + q(1− πs)ω + [(1− q) + qπs] h
= (2− πs)qω + [1− q(1− πs)]h (12)
Conditional on q, the value of white supervisor jobs to black workers is strictly lower than
the value of black supervisor jobs to black workers and the value of employment to white
workers. This is a direct result of the positive πs probability that they will lose a good match
job due to a prejudice-based termination. If they receive a job offer from a white supervisor
firm in period 1, they will accept it so long as V bw2 (q) ≥ U
b
2 , which occurs whenever
q ≥
psh
(2− πs)ω − (1− πs)h
+
(1− ps)(ω2 + h2)
2ω [(2− πs)ω − (1− πs)h]
≡ qrbw2 . (13)
Note that since ω > h, qrbw2 > q
rbb
2 . Relative to jobs with black supervisors, black workers
have a higher reservation q for jobs with white supervisors. This is due to black workers’
lower option value of jobs with white supervisors. As they have πs probability of losing
their job when it is a good match, black workers compensate for this increased risk by only
accepting white supervisor jobs when they have a relatively higher initial wage (and higher
chance of being a good match).
To summarize, prejudice decreases the value of unemployment for black workers relative
to white workers, which in turn induces them to accept less valuable employment opportu-
nities. However, the threat of prejudice reduces the value of employment opportunities for
black workers at firms with white supervisors. Thus they are more selective with respect to
q on job offers from white supervisors than black supervisors.
2.4 Comparative Statics: Supervisor Race
The results of section 2.3 allow us to develop a rich set of empirical predictions on the behavior
of black workers across firms which do and do not have an observable black supervisor, which
we outline here. When the results we present include weak inequalities, it is only because
workers ignore supervisor race in the final period of the model.
Proposition 1. Conditional on tenure and potential experience, black workers with white
supervisors earn (weakly) higher wages on average than black workers with black supervi-
sors.12
12Proof of this and all other results can be found in Appendix A.1.
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As we showed in the previous subsection, black workers have a higher reservation q for
jobs with white supervisors than black supervisors, as there is a higher threat of termination
from white supervisor firms. Thus, the wages for black workers with white supervisors
is drawn from a strictly higher distribution than the wages of black workers with black
supervisors.
Proposition 2. Conditional on tenure and potential experience, the average wage of black
workers with black supervisors (weakly) decreases as prejudice increases.
As the fraction of prejudiced firms increases in the labor market, the job arrival rate
for black workers decreases, because prejudiced employers sometimes refuse employment to
black workers. This decreases the value of unemployment for black workers, and thus black
workers lower their reservation signal for jobs with black supervisors. As the lower limit of
the match quality signal of accepted jobs with black supervisors decreases, the average wage
of black workers decreases also.
Proposition 3. Conditional on tenure and potential experience, the difference in mean
wages between black workers with white supervisors and black workers with black supervisors
is (weakly) increasing in the level of prejudice, so long as prejudice among white supervisors
is not too pervasive. A sufficient condition for this property to hold is (1 − b)(1 − 2ps) >
p2s(b− s).
Proposition 3 is perhaps our model’s most surprising wage result. When the fraction of
prejudiced firms increases, the wage gap between workers with black supervisors and workers
with white supervisors actually increases. As prejudice increases, the value of unemployment
decreases which causes black workers to become less selective on the jobs they accept. For
black supervisor jobs, this simply requires a reduction in qrbb2 . However, an increase in
the number of prejudiced firms increases the probability that white supervisor firms are
prejudiced. This increased termination risk decreases the value of white supervisor jobs
holding qrbw2 constant. Thus an equal reduction in reservation job value due to a increase in
prejudice will generally involve a larger decrease in qrbb2 than q
rbw
2 .
The exception is when workers are fairly certain that white supervisors firms are preju-
diced (i.e., π is very high) which generally occurs for large values of b and p. In this case, the
termination risk from a white supervisor job is sufficiently high that changes in the match
quality signal have very little marginal impact on the value of the job opportunity. Regard-
less of initial match quality, jobs with a white supervisor will likely be terminated after one
period. Since the worker must be indifferent between unemployment and employment at the
reservation wage, large downward adjustments in the reservation wage for white supervisors
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are required when prejudice changes slightly. The parameters required for this proposition
to fail are unlikely be relevant in our current society. It would hold even if 75% of firms were
prejudiced and 50% of unprejudiced firms employed a black supervisor, which are well above
estimates from both our own paper and other sources.13
Our model also generates predictions on job stability.
Proposition 4. Conditional on starting potential experience, black workers have (weakly)
more stable matches (longer job durations) in jobs with black supervisors than with white
supervisors.
Although black workers have a lower reservation match quality signal for accepting jobs
with black supervisors, it is never sufficiently low so as to offset the termination risk posed
from white supervisor jobs. At the reservation wages, workers are indifferent between offers
from white supervisor firms and black supervisor firms. Since white supervisor job wages
are higher at the reservation match probabilities, it must be that black supervisor jobs are
more stable.
Proposition 5. Conditional on starting potential experience, the stability of black workers’
matches with black supervisors (weakly) decreases as prejudice increases.
This result follows from Proposition 2. Black workers accept black supervisor jobs with
lower probabilities of being good matches as prejudice increases, leading to more bad matches
and turnover.
Proposition 6. Conditional on starting potential experience, the stability of black workers’
matches with white supervisors (weakly) decreases as prejudice increases.
The effect of prejudice on the average wage of black workers with white supervisors is
ambiguous; the effect on job stability is not. As discussed before, an increase in prejudice
levels increases the probability that white supervisor firms are prejudiced, which increases the
termination risk at these jobs. Although black workers can compensate for this by becoming
more selective on the quality of jobs they can accept, prejudice increases also decrease the
13Structural estimates from Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) imply that 56% of firms have some prejudice
against hiring blacks. Using our own measures of prejudice, we do not observe a level of prejudice above
75% in any region other than the South, and only on the weakest questions of prejudice. Lang and Lehmann
(2012) draw on similar surveys of social attitudes to conclude that widespread “strong prejudice” cannot be
a credible foundation for a discrimination model, although the prejudice in our model may be more similar
to their idea of “weak prejudice.” Giuliano et. al (2009) report that 6.6% of retail managers in the Consumer
Population Survey are black, and 5.9% of managers within the particular firm for which they have data.
In our model, if 75% of firms were prejudiced and 50% of non-prejudiced firms employed black supervisors,
then 12.5% of white workers should have a black supervisor. However, in our data, white workers encounter
black supervisors during only 8% of their job-spells.
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value of unemployment, making them unwilling to do so enough to completely offset this
risk.
2.5 Comparative Statics: Worker Race
We can also compare the results of 2.2 and 2.3 to generate predictions across worker race.
Proposition 7. Conditional on tenure and potential experience, the average wage of black
workers in jobs with black supervisors is (weakly) lower than the average wage for white
workers.
As we saw in section 2.3, black workers have lower reservation match quality probabilities
for jobs with black supervisors than white workers, and thus the distribution of accepted
black worker-black supervisor wages is strictly lower. Note that this is not necessarily the
case for black workers with white supervisors. This comparison depends on the fraction
of prejudiced firms, the probability of arbitrary termination, and the informativeness of the
supervisor’s race. For example, if supervisor race is a very informative of employer prejudice,
and thus termination risk to black workers from white supervisors is very high, black workers
will only accept jobs from white supervisor firms with a very high q. This would lead to very
few black worker-white supervisor jobs, but these jobs would pay higher wages conditional
on tenure than earned by the typical white worker.
Proposition 8. Conditional on starting potential experience, black workers have on average
(weakly) less job stability than white workers regardless of supervisor race.
As black workers are less selective in accepting jobs with black supervisors than white
workers, these jobs will be less stable. Further, Proposition 6 shows that black worker jobs
with white supervisors will be even less stable than jobs with black supervisors. Thus our
model produces the empirical regularity that blacks have lower job stability than whites.
3 Data
We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) and the General
Social Survey (GSS) to test our theoretical predictions. The NLSY97 surveys a sample of
individuals who were aged 12 to 18 in 1997 annually on a wide array of topics including
scholastic aptitude, family characteristics, and labor market outcomes. Of most interest
to us are the annual job surveys. In each year, the NLSY97 tracks all jobs in which the
respondent worked in the previous year and allows these jobs to be linked across survey
12
years. Hence, we are able to measure the duration of employment matches that terminated
before 2012 (the final released year of the survey) and the duration of employment as of 2012
for the most current job. Important for our purposes, the NLSY97 provides information on
the race of the individual’s supervisor for each job until the 2009 survey. This variable
allows us to estimate the effect of supervisor race on labor market outcomes predicted by
our theoretical model.
The GSS is a biannual survey of social attitudes conducted on a nationally representa-
tive sample in the United States.14 Included in this survey are various questions assessing
individuals’ racial attitudes with which we can measure prejudice. We combine the cross-
sectional samples from the 1998-2010 waves of the GSS and calculate the fraction of white
individuals who hold certain racial beliefs at the state-level.
Prejudice in our model is specifically defined as a distaste for black workers strong
enough that one would make employment decisions on the basis of race. Although the GSS
asks questions about a variety of racial attitudes, none directly addresses attitudes towards
black workers in the workplace. We thus view each of these as measures that are positively
correlated with employment prejudice and measured with error. If we define pk as the rate
of employment prejudice in state k and mjk, j ∈ {1, ..J} as the J measures of prejudice in
the GSS, then we can relate these measures by15
mjk = αjpk + ǫjk (14)
Under the assumptions that E[ǫjkǫlk] = 0∀j 6= l and E[pkǫjk] = 0, we can estimate pk up to
a positive scalar using standard factor analysis.16
We restrict our attention to questions that we felt best measure racial animus rather than,
14The Survey was conducted every year from 1972 to 1994 (except in 1979, 1981, and 1992). Since then,
it has been conducted biannually.
15One way to interpret this would be that αj is the rate at which an individual who holds employment
prejudice p also holds belief mj . Values of αj > 1 then indicate that only some individuals who hold mj
would display prejudice in employment decisions, while values of αj < 1 would indicate that there are
additional individuals in the population who would display prejudice in employment decisions beyond those
who express mjk.
16Factor analysis is an increasingly common tool used to estimate latent variable models in economics.
It has been used, for example, to estimate college quality (Black and Smith, 2006), the skill content of
jobs (Bacolod, Blum, and Strange, 2009), parental investment (Aizer and Cunha, 2012), and the prevalence
of crack cocaine (Fryer Jr. et al., 2013). It also frequently used to estimate cognitive and non-cognitive
human capital in a dynamic setting. See, for example, Cunha and Heckman (2008), Cunha, Heckman, and
Schennach (2010), and Sarzosa (2015).
Charles and Guryan (2008) take great care to measure prejudice as the “marginally prejudiced individual”
which in Becker’s friction-less model is the relevant prejudice measure for the theoretical predictions. We
intentionally measure prejudice differently, as in our model with market frictions the relevant measure of
prejudice is the fraction of prejudiced employers, which is identified up to a positive scalar multiple by factor
analysis under the set of assumptions we laid out.
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for example, political sentiments.17 From this subset of questions, we select a diverse set of
five questions for mj that had large samples of respondents: 1) whether they believe racial
disparities are due to blacks’ “lack of will”, 2) whether they believe racial disparities are not
due to discrimination, 3) whether they would be opposed to a close family member marrying
a black individual, 4) whether they are opposed to open housing laws, and 5) whether they
believe blacks are “lazy.”18 In practice, the choice of questions is of little consequence to
our results.19 We calculate the fraction of prejudiced responses for each question at the
state-level. To avoid confounding our measures with time trends in prejudice, we adjust
each state’s yearly prejudice rates using a common national time trend.20 We then use these
measures to estimate the factor model.21 Following convention, we normalize our measure
to be mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across states.22
In Table 1, we report these racial attitudes and our prejudice measure by census divi-
sion.23 Prejudice appears to be highest in the South (divisions 5-7), particularly in the East
South Central (division 7) which consists of Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee.
The New England (division 1), Mountain (division 8), and Pacific (division 9) regions appear
to have the least level of prejudice, although the ordering depends on the question. Our prej-
udice measure matches the conclusions one would draw from the underlying questions, with
prejudice highest in the South and lowest on the two coasts. We also see substantial varia-
tion in prejudice within each census division; the standard deviation of state-level prejudice
is less than 0.4 in only two of the nine divisions. To provide a context for interpreting the
prejudice magnitudes, a one standard deviation increase in prejudice corresponds roughly to
moving from New England to the West North Central (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota).
17For example, we did not consider a question on whether a racist book should be removed from a library,
as this may elicit one’s attitudes towards free speech. We also did not consider any of the numerous questions
gauging attitudes on affirmative action, which may provoke responses on one’s political ideology.
18For a detailed description of these questions, see the Appendix B.
19See Appendix C for results from a large set of alternative measures of prejudice from the GSS.
20We first calculate the fraction in each state who holds each view in each wave of the survey. We than
estimate a linear time-trend in these data, and subtract the trend from each state-year estimate before
combining the years to create one state measure.
21The factor loadings are lack of will (.92), no discrimination (.82), oppose marriage of close family member
(.83), oppose open housing laws (.68), and lazy (.88).
22We note here that p in our model is more accurately defined as the rate of prejudice held by employers,
while we can only measure this for the population at large. This would be a concern if the relationship
between prejudice held by the population and prejudice held by employers differed systematically across
states in a way that was correlated with local labor market conditions. While it is difficult to test directly
for this in the GSS, we see little difference across states in the relationship between real income and responses
on our individual prejudice questions, suggesting that this is not likely to be a major concern.
23The number of states in a census division ranges from 3 (Division 2) to 8 (Division 5). For confidentiality
reasons, we are not permitted to display descriptive statistics at a level that is less aggregated than 3 states.
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We match these prejudice measures with the individuals in the NSLY97 geocode files
to create a panel of jobs, supervisor race, and levels of prejudice for the state in which the
worker lives. Supervisor race is of particular importance. Throughout a job spell, workers
often work under different supervisors of different races.24 As we view supervisor race as a
signal of employer prejudice to workers, we are interested in supervisor race as a measure
the prevalence of blacks in observable authority positions in a firm. We therefore record a
worker as working for a firm with a black supervisor if we ever observe them working with a
black supervisor during that job spell. In this sense, we can think of our variable as a noisy
measure of whether the employer employs any blacks in supervisory positions.25
We drop all job-year observations with reported wages less than $1 per hour or above
$100 per hour, job-years with less than 30 hours or more than 80 hours of work per week,
and job-years before an individual has completed his education.26 We drop individuals who
report less than 9 years of education and keep only white and black individuals in order
to focus our attention on the black-white wage and employment gap. We likewise drop job
spells where we observe non-white, non-black supervisors in each year, and job spells for
which we never observe supervisor’s race. These restrictions yield a sample with 34,123
job-year observations, 31,666 of which have a valid state-level measure of prejudice.
In Table 2, we show descriptive statistics of our sample broken down by race. To avoid
over-weighting jobs with very short spells, we weight each observation by the number of
days the worker was employed in that position in a given year.27 We can thus view our
results as representative of the average job a worker worked in a given year. Consistent
with previous research, blacks earn lower wages, have lower average education, have shorter
job durations, score in the lower percentiles on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
24For instance, in our data 4% of white workers work underneath a black supervisor at a given point in
time, but 8% of white workers are employed in a job spell where they have in the past or will in the future
work underneath a black supervisor.
25Since all job spells are finite, and assuming most supervisors are white, our measure is biased towards 0
(having a white supervisor). Further this bias will be greater for shorter job spells, as we have less information
to infer the composition of the firm’s hierarchy. It will also be greater for jobs that last after 2008, for which
we do not observe supervisor’s race. As we will discuss later, this should only be a problem if we believe this
bias differs in magnitude for white and black workers conditional on supervisor race. We will also explore
robustness of our results to measures of supervisor race that do not have a correlation between the bias and
job spell duration.
26A small number of workers report starting jobs very early in their lifetime (in some cases even before they
were born). We drop all jobs that report being started before age 14 even if they pass our hours restrictions,
as these likely represent data errors that can distort our tenure measure.
27Because the NLSY97 is a panel, we use the interview dates to calculate the number of days of employment
at a firm each observation represents for jobs that were held over multiple surveys. We weight all jobs that
were worked for more than 365 days between surveys (either due to the survey being not quite annual or
because the worker did not respond in a previous survey year) as if they were worked for exactly 365 days.
Our results are not sensitive to this modification, and are robust to weighting all jobs equally.
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and Battery (ASVAB), and have a higher implied female labor force participation rate.28
There is a startling amount of implied segregation by supervisor race. Only 8% of white
workers work at an establishment in which they will encounter a black supervisor, compared
to 53% of black workers. Black workers live, on average, in areas with slightly higher rates of
prejudice.29 While the difference in responses on each individual question is small, it amounts
to a 0.41 standard deviation difference in overall prejudice. This is roughly equivalent to the
difference in prejudice between the Mid-Atlantic States and the West North Central States.
In Table 3, we break down our sample by supervisor race. Black supervisors’ workers earn
lower wages, are less educated, and score in lower percentiles of the ASVAB than those who
work for white supervisors. However, this is likely because black workers account for 76% of
black supervisor job-years, compared to just 20% of white supervisor job-years. Similar to
black workers, the average worker in a job spell with a a black supervisor lives in a state with
a 0.32 standard deviation higher level of prejudice, which is roughly the difference between
the Upper Midwest and the Mid-Atlantic States.
4 Results
4.1 Wage Effects
In this section, we test the key predictions of our model along two dimensions: wage and job
stability. We first examine how wages vary across supervisor race. Our main specification
estimates a pooled regression model of
logWi = βXi + γ1b
w
i + γ2b
e
i + γ3b
w
i b
e
i + εi (15)
where Xi is a vector of job- and worker-specific controls, b
w
i is an indicator equal to one if the
worker is black, bei is an indicator equal to one if the employer is a black supervisor estab-
lishment, and εi is the econometric error term. The coefficient γ1 represents the conditional
black-white wage gap among white supervisors. The coefficient γ2 represents the conditional
difference in wages between workers with black supervisors and white supervisors for white
workers. The coefficient γ3 represents the conditional difference in the “supervisor wage gap”
for black workers relative to whites.
There are inevitably unobservable differences between establishments that employ black
28Previous research has shown that the labor force participation decisions of women differ across race
(Neal, 2004). Restricting our sample to only males yields similar results.
29As workers may sometimes switch states of residence during a job spell, we measure prejudice only
through the state they resided in when they first report the spell. This is primarily a concern during the
final year of the spell, where the job may have ended because the worker moved to a new location.
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supervisors and those that do not which are correlated with wage. While we have some
limited employer characteristics in the NLSY97 to use as controls, it is unlikely that they
can fully account for these differences. Our identifying assumption is that the remaining
unobservable factors influence the wages of blacks and whites equally. Our model assumes
that the establishment-level prejudice should not influence the wages of whites, and hence
the effect of unobservables establishment differences on wages will be accounted for by γ2.
30
Our model’s prediction is then γ3 < 0: blacks accept positions with lower wages to work at
firms with a strong black presence in supervisor roles.
We report our results on wages in Table 4.31 In column (1) we estimate a standard
Mincer regression with controls for education, gender, and quartics in experience and tenure.
Black workers whom we only observe with white supervisors earn about 12% less than white
workers with white supervisors. Interestingly, white wages do not vary with supervisor
race once controlling for worker characteristics, which suggests unobservable firm differences
across supervisor race may not be too severe. Consistent with our model, blacks earn 5.9
percent less in firms observed with black supervisors relative to wages in firms with white
supervisors.
To control for differences in geographic dispersion by race, we include state and year
fixed effects in column (2). Our results remain unchanged. In column (3), we account for
differences in job quality by controlling for industry and occupation fixed effects, the log of
establishment size, and indicators for whether the worker receives any job benefits, whether
he is a member of a union, and whether he has employer sponsored health insurance.32
Our main parameter of interest remains negative and statistically significant. Finally, to
further account for individual heterogeneity, we control for a quartic in the worker’s ASVAB
percentile score in column (4). Although inclusion of the full set of controls reduces the racial
wage gap at white supervisor establishments by roughly 60%, the wage differences for black
workers across supervisor race is only slightly reduced.33 Our point estimates suggest that
the racial wage gap at white supervisor establishments is 4.7%, but 8.4% at black supervisor
30One concern is that γ2 could be picking up white worker tastes for segregated firms or same-race man-
agement. As we will discuss in a later section, the data do not appear to support this interpretation.
31As there are likely common shocks to individual wages, we cluster our standard errors at the individual
level. This formulation allows errors to be correlated within a job spell, the unit of variation of our main
variable of interest.
32For state fixed effects, we use the state in which the individual was living when they first reported the
job. This is to avoid, for example, recording a job which was terminated due to a move as being in the
state in which the worker recently moved to. Industry fixed effects are 2-digit NAICS (2002) codes, while
occupation fixed effects are 2-digit SOC (2002) codes. We convert the census industry and occupation codes
provided by the NLSY into NAICS and SOC codes using the crosswalk provided by the Census.
33We lose a non-trivial portion of the sample in this specification due to missing ASVAB scores. There is
little difference in our results when we re-estimate columns (1)-(3) excluding those with a missing ASVAB.
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establishments.
We can alternatively control for worker heterogeneity by exploiting the panel nature of
the NLSY97. In columns (5) through (7), we estimate
logWit = βXit + γ2b
e
it + γ3b
w
i b
e
it + ωi + εit (16)
where Xit is a vector of time-varying controls, and ωi is a worker fixed effect. Here we
identify the supervisor race effect from workers who have worked in both black supervisor
and white supervisor jobs. This strategy would be appropriate if the bias induced by the
unobservable differences in workers who work for supervisors of varying races is less than
the bias induced by the unobservable factors which would cause an individual to accept a
job offer with a supervisor of a different race than before.34 The trade-off is that we have
less power for estimation: only 1,307 of our 5,496 workers have both a black supervisor and
white supervisor job spell.
Our within-worker results are consistent with the estimates from our pooled specification.
In column (4) which includes quartics in tenure and potential experience, we observe that
relative to whites, blacks see a 5.5 percent decrease in their wages when moving from an
establishment with a white supervisor to one with a black supervisor. We add state and
year fixed effects in column (5), and state, year, industry, and occupation fixed effects, as
well as our employer characteristics, in column (6). In each of these specifications, γ3 remains
negative, statistically significant, and of similar magnitude to the analogous pooled results
Our model also makes predictions on how the correlation between supervisor race and
wages will vary with levels of prejudice in the market. For our pooled cross-sectional ap-
proach, we estimate
logWis = βXi + γ1b
w
i + γ2b
e
i + γ3b
w
i b
e
i + γ4ps + γ5b
w
i ps + γ6b
e
ips + γ7b
w
i b
e
ips + εis (17)
As prejudice is normalized to be mean zero, γ1, γ2, and γ3 represent the same statistics as
in (16) for the mean state. The coefficient γ4 represents the rate at which white workers
wages with white supervisors changes with a one standard deviation increase the number
of prejudiced individuals in a worker’s state, while γ5 represents the differential effect for
black workers with white supervisors. The parameter γ6 represents the rate at which white
workers wages with black supervisors change relative to white workers with white supervisors
34It is difficult to know how large this bias could be, but workers who have worked in both a white
supervisor and a black supervisor job spell have nearly identical education and ASVAB test scores to those
who have worked only in occupations with a supervisor of one race. This of course does not rule out that
there could be differences across the two samples in time invariant unobservables, or that time-varying
unobservables differ at the times in which they accept employment with a supervisor of a different race.
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as prejudice increases. Finally, γ7 estimates how black wages with black supervisors change
as prejudice increases relative to the rate at which white wages with black supervisors change.
As with our previous empirical model, there are likely unobservable firm characteristics
that influence wages and are correlated with the race of supervisors. Further, it is likely that
these characteristics differ in areas of the country where there are more or less prejudice. So
long as these characteristics do not have different effects on black and white workers, they
should be accounted for by γ4 and γ6 (i.e. the prejudice-varying impact of different raced
supervisors on white worker wages.) Our model makes two empirical predictions. First,
γ7 < 0; the supervisor race wage gap among black workers is increasing in the level of local
prejudice. Second, γ5 + γ7 < 0; black workers with black supervisors in more prejudiced
areas earn less than those in less prejudiced areas.
We estimate equation (17) in Table 5.35 Column (1) estimates the basic Mincer specifica-
tion. The coefficient on prejudice, which represents the impact of increasing prejudice on the
wages of white workers, is strongly and statistically significantly negative. Meanwhile, the
interaction between prejudice and black supervisor, which represents the differential impact
of prejudice for white workers with black supervisors is positive, though not statistically
significant. There are two likely reasons for these results. First, due to the geographical
concentration of prejudice in the south, prejudice is likely correlated with lower wage eco-
nomic conditions. Second, the types of firms which employ black supervisors likely vary
with levels of prejudice. For instance, in areas of high prejudice, employing a racially diverse
leadership group may become correlated with other positive business decisions that lead to
higher wages. We thus do not place a strong weight on the interpretation of these variables
for analyzing the impact of prejudice. Our model, however, is concerned with how prejudice
impacts black workers. To the extent that our estimates for white workers capture these
unobservable geographic differences, our tests for black workers should still remain valid.
Turning our attention to the impact on black workers, in column (1) we see that prejudice
does not have any impact on the wages of black workers with white supervisors. This is
consistent with our model; black workers respond to an increase in prejudice by being more
selective on the types of jobs they accept with white supervisors, which may lead to their
observed wages increasing or remaining constant. As predicted, the wages for blacks with
black supervisors (γ5 + γ7) are decreasing in prejudice and the “supervisor race gap” (γ7) is
increasing, although neither of these effects are statistically significant. In part to control
for the geographic concentration of prejudiced beliefs, we add in fixed effects for the nine
35To allow for errors to be correlated within states, we cluster our standard errors at the state level, which
is the level of variation for prejudice. This approach generally produces more conservative estimates than
clustering at the individual-level.
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geographic census divisions in column (2), and thus our effects are estimated off of variation
within states that are in close geographical proximity to one another.36 These controls have
little impact on our results; the coefficients of interest retain the proper sign but are not
statistically significant. Adding industry, occupation, and employer controls in column (3),
and a quartic in ASVAB score in column (4) likewise yield similar results.
We include worker fixed effects in columns (5)-(7). Here the impact of prejudice on
workers with white supervisors is identified off of workers who move to a different state. The
interactions with being employed with a black supervisor are identified off of variations in
the magnitude of the change in wages when switching from a white supervisor establishment
to a black supervisor establishment across states with different measured prejudice. In
column (5), which includes only controls for time-varying worker characteristics, the effect
of increasing prejudice on black worker-black supervisor wages (γ5 + γ7) is negative and
significant at the 1% level. This result is robust to including census division and year effects
in column (6) and industry and occupation effects in column (7). The effect of prejudice
on the “supervisor race” wage gap, the triple interaction term, is negative and much larger
than estimated in the pooled cross-section. This too becomes statistically significant with
a full set of controls in column (7).37 Interestingly, the results of column (5) to (7) suggest
that black workers with white supervisors also see a decrease in their wages as prejudice
increases. Our estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in prejudice, which
roughly corresponds to moving from New England to the West North Central division of the
Midwest, leads to a 11% decrease in the accepted wages of black workers at establishments
with black supervisors, and a 6 percentage point widening of the observed wage gap between
black workers with white supervisors and black workers with black supervisors.
4.2 Job Stability
Our model makes a separate prediction on job stability by supervisor race. As jobs with black
supervisors offer black workers less exposure to prejudice than jobs with white supervisors, we
expect these jobs to have greater job stability. To investigate this relationship, we calculate
the total duration of each job-worker match, to create a sample of jobs rather than job-years.
In our three-period model, employment durations last at most two periods, and there
36As an additional robustness check, we estimated all of our main results excluding workers in the South
which has by far the highest concentration of prejudice. The magnitudes of our results are nearly universally
stronger, although they are estimated with less precision. These results are available upon request.
37One concern is that, as our main results are identified off of only workers who move to a different state
or work under jobs with supervisors of different races, our stronger results are due to a change in the sample
relative to the pooled cross-sections. However, this does not appear to be the case. Estimating our model
without worker fixed effects on the sample of workers who move states or work jobs with supervisors of
different races yields nearly identical results to the full sample.
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is only one opportunity for a prejudiced employer to terminate the relationship. In reality,
an employer has many opportunities to terminate employment and thus a worker’s belief
about an employer are constantly evolving. Since black workers are more selective on the
jobs they accept with white supervisors, it is possible that long-standing black worker-white
supervisor matches may be more stable; their historical stability is evidence that they are
not prejudiced.38 We thus focus on short-term stability, where our model more clearly holds.
Specifically, we define a job as stable if it lasts more than one year. We drop any jobs which
we observe for less than one year and do not observe an end date. Note that since our
sample ends three years after the NLSY stops asking the supervisor race question, missing
observations are due only to attrition, not right-censoring. Given that our workers are in
their early-career, job durations are relatively short. Only 57% of our sample of 14,125 jobs
last more than one year.
We estimate a linear probability model,
Zi = βXi + γ1b
w
i + γ2b
e
i + γ3b
w
i b
e
i + εi (18)
where Zi is an indicator for whether job i lasted more than one year and Xi is a vector of job-
and worker-specific controls.39 Again, while we expect that unobservable firm characteristics
which may influence job stability are correlated with the likelihood of employing a black
supervisor, these will be captured by γ2 provided they do not effect black and white workers
differently.40 Our model predicts that γ1 > 0 and γ3 < 0. Blacks have less stable employment
with white supervisors as these firms are more likely to take prejudiced action against them.
We show the results of this estimation in Table 6. The results support our model. In
column (1), with only a basic set of worker controls, we observe that black workers with
white supervisors are 8.1 percentage points less likely to remain employed after one year
than whites with white supervisors. While all workers have more job stability at black
supervisor establishments, black workers gain 4.9 percentage points more than whites. Both
of our main results are statistically significant. These results are robust to including state
and start year fixed effects in column 2. Industry, occupation, and employer characteristic
controls, which we include in column (3), can explain all of the increased job stability for
white workers with black supervisors. However, our estimate for the stability gain for black
supervisors actually increases in magnitude.41 Our results remain consistent once accounting
38It would, thus, not be appropriate to estimate a proportional hazard model in this case, as the hazard
function would depend on worker and supervisor race.
39Our results are robust to alternatively estimating a logit or probit model.
40This will also capture the fact that our measure of having a black supervisor is correlated with job
duration by construction.
41Workers sometimes report changes in occupation and industry during a job spell. We use fixed effects
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for differences in cognitive test scores in column (4). With the full set of controls, our cross-
sectional results imply that black workers with white supervisors are 6.9 percentage points
less likely to remain employed after 1 year than white workers. While supervisor race does
not impact the job stability of whites, black workers at black supervisor establishments are
6.1 percentage points more likely to remain employed at the same establishment after 1 year
than black workers with white supervisors.42
We include worker fixed effects in columns (5)-(7). The effect of supervisor race is thus
identified off of differences in job stability within workers on job spells with different raced
supervisors. Given that only roughly 20% of our workers worked at both a black supervisor
and white supervisor establishment, our estimates are substantially less precise than in the
pooled cross-section approach. We do not see strong evidence for our model in the basic
specification or including state and year fixed effects. However, once we include occupation,
industry, and employer characteristic controls in column (7) our point estimate is of similar
magnitude to what we observed in the pooled cross-sections, although it is not statistically
significant at conventional levels.
Our model generates one final set of predictions on the interaction between job stability
and prejudice. As prejudice increases, black workers’ jobs become less stable regardless
of supervisor race. Jobs with white supervisors become less stable as prejudice directly
influences their stability. Jobs with black supervisors become less stable because blacks
lower their reservation match quality as employment opportunities decrease. Following the
same strategy as before, in Table 7 we estimate,
Zi = βXi + γ1b
w
i + γ2b
e
i + γ3b
w
i b
e
i + γ4ps + γ5b
w
i ps + γ6b
e
ips + γ7b
w
i b
e
ips + εis (19)
where our predictions are γ5 < 0 and γ5 + γ7 < 0. We find some support for the second
hypothesis in the pooled cross-section. While the effect is small and statistically insignificant
when we include only a basic set of controls, the magnitude increases substantially when
we add in industry, occupation, and employer characteristics in column (3). The result
becomes statistically significant once we include a quartic in ASVAB score in column (4).
Our estimates suggest that increasing the level of prejudice by one standard deviation, which
amounts to moving from New England to the West North Central division of the Midwest,
would lead to a 4 percentage point decrease in the probability that black workers with black
supervisors would remain in their job for at least one year. We find little support for the first
for the first occupation and industry which they report.
42Note also that our model predicts that black workers with black supervisors should have lower job
stability than white workers. In each of our specifications, black workers with black supervisors have lower
job stability than white workers with black supervisors, although this is difference is never statistically
significant.
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hypothesis. The estimated effect of prejudice on black-worker white supervisor job stability
is never significant and always close to zero.
We observe stronger support for our model once we include worker fixed effects. All
of our estimates for γ5 + γ7 are larger in magnitude than the comparable cross-sectional
regression. The result is statistically significant when including census division and start
year fixed effects in column (6). We lose statistical significance when we include industry,
occupation, and employer controls in column (7) but this is primarily due to precision;
our point estimate is above that which we estimated with statistical significance in the
pooled cross-sections. We also see some support for our first hypothesis. With a full set of
controls, we estimate that the stability of black worker-white supervisor matches decreases
by 2.1 percentage points with a 1 standard deviation increase in prejudice. However, these
estimates are very imprecise.
To check the robustness of our results to different definitions of job stability, we estimate
(18) and (19) for every value of job duration between 60 and 1080 days, in 30 day intervals.
We display the point estimates of interest for the cross-sectional specification with a full
set of controls in Figures 2 and 3, respectively.43 While not always significant, the point
estimates are correct signed for almost every definition.
4.3 Robustness
Since supervisor race is calculated at the job spell level, longer job spells are more likely to
be categorized as black supervisor jobs. One concern then is that our supervisor race effects
are simply proxying for the characteristics of jobs which make them more stable. Given
our identification strategy, this is only a problem if these characteristics affect black workers
differently than whites. Nonetheless, in Appendix C.1, we investigate the robustness of our
results under three scenarios that can partially account for this problem: 1) using only pre-
2009 data, thus eliminating selected data at the end of the sample when the supervisor race
question is no longer asked, 2) identifying a job’s supervisor race based on the first reported
supervisor, which eliminates the constructed correlation between job stability and supervisor
race but increases measurement error and the reporting bias towards white supervisors, and
3) directly controlling for the completed length of the job spell. The results of each of these
strategies are consistent with our main findings.
Our constructed measure of prejudice provides an interval-scaled measure of employer
prejudice provided that the fraction of individuals who give a prejudiced response to each of
43To produce a confidence interval for γ5 + γ7, we estimate a regression including a Black X White
Supervisor and Black X Black Supervisor interaction (rather than a Black indicator and Black X Black
Supervisor interaction), and use the standard error from the latter estimate.
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the questions we use is linearly related to the fraction of prejudiced employers in a state.44
We could alternatively measure prejudice using only a single question which would be correct
under the weaker assumption that that question is linearly related to the fraction of preju-
diced employers. However, the measurement error problem will be more severe, suggesting
that the results will be further attenuated. In Appendix C.2, we estimate our main results
under 9 different measures of prejudice from the GSS, including the individual questions that
make up our factor analysis. Regardless of the question we use, our point estimates maintain
the correct sign, and most are statistically significant.45 This suggests that our model would
be confirmed by nearly any way we construct a prejudice measure from the underlying GSS
data.
It is possible that the lower job stability we observe for black workers at white supervisor
firms is in fact a positive if, for instance, these firms provide better networks and workers are
able to quickly find higher wage opportunities outside the firm. To test this, we estimated
the impact of supervisor race on the wages of the next job a worker accepts. We find no
significant relationship, suggesting this is not the case.46
4.4 Alternative Explanations
While we posit the source of prejudice in our model is employers, many of our results would
follow through from a model in which workers had a taste for same-race management. If
racial tastes drive worker decisions, it could be problematic for our identification strategy.
The estimated effect of being at a black supervisor establishment on white worker wages
would reflect both unobservable establishment-level differences and a premium that must be
paid to whites to overcome their distaste. It is not clear that such a model would imply
that the gap in wages by supervisor race for black workers would be increasing in prejudice.
Likewise, if black workers had higher job stability with black supervisor establishments
because of a positive taste, it would seem to us that this job stability should be increasing
in prejudice, rather than decreasing, as the unprejudiced job opportunities outside the firm
diminish. Nonetheless, we do not rule out that it may be possible to construct a model based
on worker tastes which allows this seemingly contradictory conclusion.
If workers tastes are important, however, it should also be that the actual race of the
supervisor matters within a job spell. If a black worker is moved from a black supervisor
44We note that having an interval-scaled measure of prejudice is important, as it is nearly impossible to
make cross-group comparisons with ordinal data (Bond and Lang, 2013a; 2014).
458 out of 9 measures produce a statistically significant negative relationship between black worker-black
supervisor wages and prejudice. This number is 5 out of 9 for the supervisor race wage gap, and 4 out of 9
for the relationship between prejudice and black worker-black supervisor job stability.
46These results are available upon request.
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to a white supervisor, they should require a wage increase to compensate them for their
distaste. As we observe 1,303 job spells in which a worker’s supervisor changes race, we can
test this in the data. We do this in Table 8 by including job fixed effects.47 We find no
evidence to support the idea that tastes for supervisor race within a job are important. Our
point estimate for the effect on a black worker of switching to a black supervisor, is negative,
but small and statistically insignificant. The estimate for white workers is almost exactly
zero, suggesting that our identification strategy is not confounded by white worker tastes.
In columns (3) and (4), we include an interaction between supervisor race and prejudice.
While the point estimates suggest that tastes for supervisors may be important within a job
for white workers in high prejudice areas, they are imprecisely estimated and statistically
indistinguishable from zero.48
In addition, our empirical findings cannot be easily explained by conventional statisti-
cal discrimination models.49 If firms with a strong black leadership presence are better at
evaluating minority candidates, black workers may end up experiencing a lower turnover
rate in these firms. However, the same differences in observability of skill or match quality
would also suggest that highly-skilled black workers would be reluctant to apply to white
supervisor firms. Such reluctance would lead to a negative selection of black workers into
these jobs, and thus, lower wages for black workers in firms with white supervisors. More-
over, in order for a statistical model to generate both higher wages and higher turnover at
white supervisor firms, it must be that black workers in these jobs have both higher average
productivity (higher wages) and a higher variance of productivity (more bad matches and
terminations) than workers at black supervisor jobs. In Figure 4, we plot the densities of
ASVAB percentile scores for each worker-supervisor job pairing and demonstrate that we do
not observe such patterns in our data. While the average percentile scores of black workers
at white supervisor firms are higher, the variance of the distribution is identical and there
is little discernible difference in the shape of the density curves.50 Hence, although statisti-
47Note that our overall sample size is reduced by one-third, since here we do not measure supervisor race
at the job-spell level. This reflects years in which we do not observe the race of the supervisor, or that the
worker has a non-black, non-white supervisor.
48We also note that, given the way our prejudice variable is scaled, the point estimates suggest that white
workers have a taste for opposite race supervisors everywhere in the United States outside of the South.
49Of course if idiosyncratic match quality is important for productivity, as it is in our model, white
supervisor firms may believe that black workers who apply to these jobs must be better matches as they
would otherwise be unwilling to take on the risk associated with a possibly prejudice firm, and thus they
statistically discriminate in their favor. At its core, we view this scenario as equivalent to the model we
present in this paper.
50It is also unclear why prejudice would matter in a model in which wage disparities are entirely statistical.
This could be the case if, for instance, black workers were on average lower skilled in areas of high prejudice.
While the average ASVAB percentile score is lower in high-prejudice states, we do not see evidence that it
is disproportionately lower for blacks.
25
cal discrimination remains an important explanation for racial wage disparities in the labor
market, it does not appear to offer an explanation for our findings on wages and job stability.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a search model where some employers hold prejudices that are
unobservable to workers. A supervisor’s race acts as a signal of the employer’s prejudice level.
Since prejudiced employers may sometimes fire black workers arbitrarily, these jobs present
less option value to black workers. Thus, they have lower reservation wages for employment
when they can observe a black supervisor. This effect leads to lower wages overall and less
job stability, but blacks still have relatively more stable matches when employed at a firm
with a black supervisor. Increasing the level of prejudice decreases the value of search for
black workers. This leads black workers to adopt lower reservation wages for jobs with black
supervisors, causing these matches to have both lower wages and less job stability. It also
decreases the value of employment with white supervisors, leading black workers to be more
selective on the types of white supervisor jobs they accept. Thus, while white supervisor jobs
become less stable as prejudice increases, the accepted wages actually increase relative to the
wages accepted by workers with black supervisors. We confirmed the main predictions of our
model using longitudinal data on job spells with information on supervisor race, matched
with data on levels of local prejudice.
Our paper has important implications for both firm and government policy. Black work-
ers respond to observable indicators of prejudice when making job decisions. In our model,
workers always earn their marginal product so firms earn zero profits. However, if firms are
able to extract a surplus from employees, non-prejudiced employers will find it beneficial to
invest in policies, for example affirmative action, that signal their lack of prejudice to black
workers. In contrast, a national affirmative action policy could have unintended negative
consequences for black welfare. If the policy does not directly remedy firm prejudice, requir-
ing firms to adopt the same hiring and promotion strategies decreases the level of information
on prejudice these provide to the market. As a result, black workers will be more willing to
accept poor quality jobs at the few firms they can ascertain with certainty are unprejudiced.
Although measured racial prejudice in the United States has declined substantially over
the last half century, our paper demonstrates that the remaining prejudice, and the incom-
plete information on which firms possess this prejudice, can still have significant negative
effects on black employment outcomes. Even when prejudice is not pervasive, the threat
of prejudice, and the inability to identify employers who possess it, causes black workers to
select into worse job opportunities with the unprejudiced employers they can identify.
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A Theoretical Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Main Results
This appendix proves the main results of our paper. As we show in the text, blacks and whites follow
the same search strategy for period 3 jobs, and black reservation wages are independent of supervisor race.
Thus, the outcomes for whites, blacks with black supervisors, and blacks with white supervisors are always
identical. We therefore will focus our proofs on search strategies for period 2 jobs.
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Average period 2 wages for black workers with supervisor race j are simply ωE[q|q ≥ qrbj2 ]. Applying
the truncated uniform distribution, the average wage of workers with black supervisors is
q¯bb2 =
ω
2
(1 + qrbb2 )
and likewise for black workers with white supervisors,
¯qbw2 =
ω
2
(1 + qrbw2 )
Since qrbb1 < q
rbb
2 , q¯
bb
2 <
¯qbw2 .
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The period 2 average wage for black workers with black supervisors is
q¯bb2 =
ω
2
(1 + qrbb2 )
and is thus a strictly increasing function of qrbb. Taking the derivative with of qrbb with respect to p,
∂qrbb
∂p
=
s
[
h− 12ω (ω
2 + h2)
]
2ω − h
= −
s
2ω
(ω − h)2
2ω − h
which is strictly less than zero since ω > h.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. From the uniform assumption, the difference in average wages is
¯qbw2 − q¯
bb
2 =
ω + qrbw2
2
−
ω + qrbb2
2
=
1
2
(qrbw2 − q
rbb
2 )
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to prejudice,
∂ ¯(qbw2 −
¯qbb2 )
∂p
=
1
2
(
∂qrbw2
∂p
−
∂qrbb2
∂p
)
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where,
∂qrbw2
∂p
=
∂pi
∂p
s(ω − h)
[
psh+ 1−ps2ω (ω
2 + h2)
]
[(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)]
2 −
s
2ω (ω − h)
2
[(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)]
∂qrbb2
∂p
= −
s
2ω (ω − h)
2
2ω − h
∂pi
∂p
=
(1− s)(1 − b)
[(1− b)(1 − p) + p(1− s)]
2
This expression simplifies to
∂ ¯(qbw2 −
¯qbb2 )
∂p
=
1
2
Ω2 [Λ3 + Λ4]
where,
Ω2 =
s(1− s)(ω − h)
2ω [(1− b)(1− p) + p(1− s)]
2
(2ω − h)[(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)]2
Λ3 = 2ωhps(2ω − h)[(1− b)(2− p) + p(1− s)] + p
2s2(ω − h)3(1 − s)
Λ4 = (2ω − h)(ω
2 + h2)[(1− b)(1− 2ps)− p2s(b − s)]
Note that since ω > h ≥ 0 and b < 1, p < 1, s < 1,Ω2 and Λ3 are both strictly positive. By inspection, Λ4 is
positive so long as (1 − b)(1 − 2ps) > p2s(b − s) and is thus a sufficient condition to guarantee the overall
sign of the derivative is positive.
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. A job with match signal q and a black supervisor lasts two periods whenever it is a good match,
which occurs with probability q. For jobs with a white supervisor, the job must be both a good match and
the employer must not terminate the worker due to prejudice. This occurs with probability (1− q)(1− pis).
Integrating over the distribution of accepted jobs, black supervisor jobs last longer provided
1 + qrbb2
2
≥
1 + qrbw2
2
(1 − pis)
substituting for the reservation wages and multiplying both sides by 2,
1 +
(1 + ps) + 1−ps2ω (ω
2 + h2)
2ω − h
≥
[
1 +
(1 + ps) + 1−ps2ω (ω
2 + h2)
(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)
]
(1 − pis)
which simplifies to
[
(1 + ps) +
1− ps
2ω
(ω2 + h2)
] [
1
2ω − h
−
(1− pis)
(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)
]
≥ −pis
the right-hand side of the inequality is negative, while the left-hand side is positive since,
(2ω − h)− (ω − h)pis > (2ω − h)− (2ω − h)pis
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A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The probability of a job accepted with a black supervisor lasting two periods is the probability that
this job is a good match. Given the uniform distribution of job offers, this amounts to
1 + qrbb2
2
In Proposition 2, we showed that
∂qrbb
2
∂p
< 0, which proves the proposition.
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The probability of a job accepted with a white supervisor lasting two periods is the probability that
this job is a good match multiplied by the probability that the worker will not be terminated by prejudice.
Given the uniform distribution of job offers, this amounts to
1 + qrbw2
2
(1− pis)
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to p,
1
2
[
−
∂pi
∂p
s+
∂qrbw2 (1 − pis)
∂p
]
The first term represents the change in the probability of a match lasting two periods at the upper-bound
(q = 1), which is negative since ∂pi
∂p
> 0. The second term represents the change in probability of the match
lasting two periods at the reservation match quality. This term must also be negative. Suppose not, and
that the reservation match quality become more stable when p increased. Given that ∂pi
∂p
> 0, this could
only happen when qrbw2 increases in p (which is possible). However, this would imply that both q
rbw
2 and
(1−pis)qrbw2 has increased, and thus the total value of employment at the reservation match quality V
bw
2 (q
rbb
2 )
has also increased. But, V bw2 (q
rbb
2 ) = U
b
2 . Taking the derivative of (8),
∂U b
∂p
= −
s
2ω
(ω − h)2
which is strictly less than zero. Thus, we have a contradiction.
A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The difference in period 2 mean wages is simply 12 (q
rw
2 − q
rbb
2 ) . As show in the text q
rw
2 > q
rbb
2 , thus
white wages will be higher.
A.1.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. The difference in stability for white workers with white supervisors and black workers with black
supervisors is
1
2
(qrw2 − q
rbb
2 )
which is positive as qrw2 > q
rbb
2 . Likewise since white supervisor jobs are always less stable for black workers
than black supervisor jobs (Proposition 4), we know that white workers will also experience longer job
durations than black workers with white supervisors. Since the average job stability for black workers is a
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linear combination of two stabilities which are less than the average stability for white workers, we know
that white workers’ overall average stability will be higher.
A.2 General Distributions of Match Quality Signal
In this section, we explore the robustness of our results to general distributions of job match-quality. We show
that all but one of our results hold for any log-concave probability distribution. For this single remaining
case, we discuss conditions under which it would hold.
Consider the model outlined in Section 2, but that instead the distribution of match quality probability
is f(q), where f(q) is a continuous, twice-differentiable, log-concave probability distribution.51 As the timing
structure remains unchanged, each worker’s reservation strategy for period 3 employment remains unchanged.
Likewise, the value of employment in period 2 remains unchanged as this depends only on q and h.
The value of unemployment in period 2 for a white worker becomes,
Uw2 = h+
ˆ 1
h
ω
q′ω − hdF (q′) + h (20)
The first part of this expression is the utility of household production from being unemployed in period 2.
The second part is the expected gain of unemployment in period 3 from receiving a job offer. The third part
of the expression is the value of unemployment in period 3 (h) which represents the utility received whenever
the worker receives a job offer below his reservation value ( h
ω
). This simplifies using integration by parts to
Uw2 = 2h+ ω
ˆ 1
h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′ (21)
By equating (21) with the value of period 2 employment (8), we can solve for a white worker’s initial
reservation wage policy,
qrw2 = (2ω − h)
−1(h+ ω
ˆ 1
h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′) (22)
The value of unemployment in period 2 for black workers differs in that ps of the time they will match
with a prejudiced employer who does not offer them a position. Thus, the value of unemployment can be
written as
U b2 = 2h+ (1− ps)ω
ˆ 1
h
ω
q′ω − hdF (q′) (23)
which simplifies by integration by parts to,
U b2 = 2h+ (1− ps)ω
ˆ 1
h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′ (24)
Black workers are concerned about supervisor race as firms with black supervisors implicitly offer them
higher job stability and more option value. Equating the value of period 2 employment at a black supervisor
firm (9) with equation (24) yields the black worker-black supervisor reservation wage,
qrbb2 = (2ω − h)
−1
[
h+ (1− ps)ω
ˆ 1
h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′
]
(25)
51It is common in search theoretic models to assume that wage distributions are log-concave as this assures
that increases in the distribution of wages lead to increases in the actual observed wages, holding constant
a reservation wage. See, for example, Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005).
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We can do likewise for the value of white supervisor employment,
qrbw2 = [(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)]
−1
[
h+ (1 − ps)ω
ˆ 1
h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′
]
(26)
We now prove our main results in this setting. Again, as all workers have identical reservation strategies
for period 3 employment, we prove our results only for period 2.
A.2.1 Propositions 1 and 4
Proposition. Conditional on tenure and potential experience, black workers with white supervisors earn
(weakly) higher wages and have (weakly) lower job stability than black workers with black supervisors
Proof. First note that qrbw2 > q
rbb
2 since pis > 0. Thus the expressions have the same numerator, but q
rbb
2 has
a larger denominator. Since the observed wages in period 2 are simply the expected value of the distribution
truncated at the reservation wage, the distributions are independent of supervisor race, and white supervisor
jobs have a higher truncation point, the distribution of white supervisor job wages first order stochastically
dominates that of black supervisor job wages and thus has a higher mean.
The probability for a job with match quality q and a black supervisor remaining in period 3 is simply
q. For a same quality job with a white supervisor, this probability is (1 − pis)q. Thus the distribution of
stability probabilities for white supervisor jobs is simply the distribution for black supervisor jobs shifted
down by a proportion. Denote q˜ as the probability of remaining in a position in period 3. Since f(q) is
log-concave, E[q˜|q˜ > q˜r] is higher for black supervisor jobs than white supervisor jobs (Burdett, 1981). In
words, if the reservation match is equally stable for black supervisor jobs and white supervisor jobs, then
the average job stability among accepted jobs will be higher for black supervisor jobs than white supervisor
jobs. Since qrbw2 > q
rbb
2 , V
bw
2 (q
rbw
2 ) can only be equal to V
bb
2 (q
rbb
2 ) if q
rbb
2 > (1 − pis)q
rbw
2 . As average match
quality is an increasing function of reservation match stability, the average stability of white supervisor jobs
must be less than that of black supervisor jobs.
A.2.2 Propositions 2, 5, and 6
Proposition. Conditional on tenure and potential experience, black workers with black supervisors’ wages
and job stability are (weakly) decreasing in prejudice. Black workers with white supervisors’ job stability is
(weakly) decreasing in prejudice.
Proof. Black workers’ wage and job stability are monotonic functions of their reservation wage, thus it is
sufficient to differentiate (25) with respect to p,
∂qrbb2
∂p
=
−sω
´ 1
h
ω
1− F (q′)dq′
(2ω − h)
which is strictly less than zero.
White supervisor job stability is also a monotonic function of the job stability of the reservation match.
As U b2 is strictly decreasing in prejudice, V
bw
2 must be decreasing at the reservation match, and this can only
occur if the reservation match becomes less stable (see proof of Proposition 6).
A.2.3 Propositions 7 and 8
Proposition. Conditional on tenure and potential experience, black workers with black supervisors’ have
(weakly) lower wages and (weakly) less job stability than white workers. Black workers with white supervisors’
have (weakly) less job stability than white workers.
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Proof. Comparing (22) to (25), note that white workers have a higher reservation match quality than black
workers with black supervisors. Since the expected wages and job stabilities are monotonic functions of the
reservation match quality, the first two parts of the proposition holds. The third part of the proposition
follows from the proof in section A.2.2, since black workers have lower job stability with white supervisors
than black supervisors.
A.2.4 Proposition 3
Proposition 3 does not directly translate to general match quality distributions. This result depends on the
curvature of the distribution. Here we show a condition under which the change in the average wage between
white supervisors and black supervisors moves in the same direction as the change in the reservation wage.
Proposition. So long as
f(qrbw
2
)
´
1
qrbw
2
q′f(q′)dq′−f ′(qrbw
2
)[1−F (qrbw
2
)]
[1−F (qrbw
2
)]2
−
f(qrbb
2
)
´
1
qrbb
2
q′f(q′)dq′−f ′(qrbb
2
)[1−F (qrbb
2
)]
[1−F (qrbb
2
)]2
> 0,
the difference in average wages of black workers with black supervisors and black workers with white supervi-
sors is increasing in prejudice, conditional on tenure and experience, whenever the difference in reservation
wages is increasing in prejudice.
Proof. The difference in average wages for black workers with white supervisors and black workers with
black supervisors is
ω


´ 1
qrbw
2
q′dF (q′)
1− F (qrbw2 )
−
´ 1
qrbb
2
q′dF (q′)
1− F (qrbb2 )


taking the derivative with respect to p,
ω
[
Θ1
∂qrbw2
∂p
−Θ2
∂qrbb2
∂p
]
where,
Θ1 ≡
f(qrbw2 )
´ 1
qrbw
2
q′f(q′)dq′ − qrbw2 f(q
rbw
2 )[1− F (q
rbw
2 )]
[1− F (qrbw2 )]
2
Θ2 ≡
f(qrbb2 )
´ 1
qrbb
2
q′f(q′)dq′ − qrbb2 f(q
rbb
2 )[1− F (q
rbb
2 )]
[1− F (qrbb2 )]
2
Thus, whenever
∂qrbw
2
∂p
>
∂qrbb
2
∂p
, the expression will also be positive if
f(qrbw
2
)
´
1
qrbw
2
q′f(q′)dq′−qrbw
2
f(qrbw
2
)[1−F (qrbw
2
)]
[1−F (qrbw
2
)]2
−
f(qrbb
2
)
´
1
qrbb
2
q′f(q′)dq′−qrbb
2
f(qrbb
2
)[1−F (qrbb
2
)]
[1−F (qrbb
2
)]2
> 0
In the main text we show a sufficient condition for the difference in reservation wages to be increasing
in prejudice. This specific condition will depend on the distribution of match qualities, however the intuition
will generally match that in the main text. To see this, note that at equilibrium, V bw2 (q
rbw
2 ) = V
bb
2 (q
rbb
2 ) = U
b
2
and thus any (negative) change in the value of unemployment must cause an equal change to the value of
reservation employment with both supervisor types. Thus,
∂U b2
∂p
= (2ω − h)
∂qrbb2
∂p
and,
∂U b2
∂p
= [(2ω − h)− pis(ω − h)]
∂qrbw2
∂p
− s(ω − h)qrbw2
∂pi
∂p
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Note the difference between these two expressions. The first expression shows that decreasing qrbw2 can
have a smaller effect on the value of unemployment than qrbb2 because prejudice (pis) decreases the value of
high-quality jobs to black workers. However, prejudice also has a direct negative effect on the value of job
opportunities with white supervisors represented by the second expression. This means that qrbw2 has to
adjust less than qrbb2 to an increase in prejudice. The former effect is strongest when pi is high.
B Data Appendix
B.1 GSS Prejudice Measures
Here we list the exact wording and coding of the questions we used to measure prejudice in the general social
survey
B.1.1 Lack Will
The variable RACDIF4 asks, “On the average African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing
than white people. Do you think these differences are because most African Americans just don’t have the
motivation or willpower to pull themselves up out of poverty?” Respondents could choose ’Yes’ or ’No.’ We
coded ’Yes’ answers as prejudiced responses. The question was asked in every survey from 1998-2010.
B.1.2 No Discrimination
The variable RACDIF1 asks, “On average African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than
white people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to discrimination?” Respondents could choose
’Yes’ or ’No.’ We coded ’Yes’ answers as prejudiced responses. This question was asked in every survey from
1998-2010.
B.1.3 Oppose Marriage
The variable MARBLK asks, “How about having a close relative or family member marry a black person?
Would you be very in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it hap-
pening, somewhat opposed or very opposed to it happening?” Respondents could choose ’Strongly Favor,’
’Favor,’ ’Neither favor nor oppose,’ ’Oppose,’ or ’Strongly Oppose.’ We coded ’Strongly Oppose’ answers as
prejudiced responses. The question was asked in every survey from 1998-2010.
B.1.4 Against Housing Laws
The variable RACOPEN asks, “Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There
are two possible laws to vote on. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his
house to, even if he prefers not to sell to African Americans. The second law says that a homeowner cannot
refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Which law would you vote for?” Respondents could
choose ‘A homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to African
Americans,’ ’A homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color,’ or ’Neither.’ We
coded the first response as prejudiced. This question was asked in every survey from 2004-2010.
B.1.5 Lazy
The variable WORKBLKS asks, “I’m going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics
of [Blacks] can be rated... A score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in the group are
[hard-working]. A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group are [lazy]. A score of 4
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means that you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose any
number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.” Respondents can
choose a number between 1-7. We coded answers of 5 or greater as prejudiced responses. This question was
asked in every survey from 1998-2010.
B.1.6 Favor Anti-Miscegenation Laws
The variable RACMAR asks, “Do you think there should be laws against marriages between African-
Americans and whites?” Respondents could choose ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ We coded ‘Yes’ answers as prejudiced
responses. This question was asked in each survey from 1998-2002.
B.1.7 Against Black President
The variable RACPRES asks, “If your party nominated an African-American for President, would you vote
for him if he were qualified for the job?” Respondents could choose ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ We coded ‘No’ responses
as prejudiced responses. The question was asked in the 2008 and 2010 surveys.
B.1.8 Inborn Differences
The variable RACDIF2 asks, “On the average African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than
white people. Do you think these differences are because most African Americans have less in-born ability
to learn?” Respondents could choose ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ We coded ‘Yes’ answers as prejudiced responses. The
question was asked in each survey from 1998-2010.
B.1.9 Smart
The variable INTLBLKS asks, “I’m going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics
of [Blacks] can be rated... A score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in the group are
[unintelligent]. A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group are [intelligent]. A score of
4 means that you think that the group is not towards one end or another, and of course you may choose
any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.” Respondents can
choose a number between 1-7. We coded answers of 3 or less as prejudiced responses. This question was
asked in every survey from 1998-2010.
C Empirical Appendix
C.1 Supervisor Race and Job Stability Correlation
In Table C1 we test the sensitivity of our wage results to three specifications in which this bias may be less
severe. In columns (1) and (2), we use only pre-2009 data to both construct our measure of supervisor race
and in estimation of the worked fixed effect specification with a full set of controls. This removes a potential
correlation between supervisor race and job quality for later jobs due to the NSLY removing the supervisor
race question from post-2009 surveys. All of our main wage results are robust. In columns (3) and (4), we
use only the race of the first reported supervisor of the job spell to classify the establishment. This removes
the potential bias, but increases measurement error which should attenuate our results. The results are again
largely supportive. While the effect of having a black supervisor on wages, and the impact of prejudice on
the “supervisor race wage gap” is not statistically significant, they retain the correct sign, and are of similar
magnitude to previous estimates. We see strong evidence that black workers with black supervisors’ wages
decrease in prejudice. In columns (5) and (6), we control for the total length of the job spell directly. While
this should eliminate the concerns about the bias of our supervisor race measure, it is an over-control in the
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sense that well matched jobs will necessarily be both high wage and more stable. Nonetheless, all of our
models predictions hold under these specifications.
In Table C2, we repeat the first two exercises on our job stability results. The results are again largely
robust. The effect of having a black supervisor on job stability is positive and significant under both
approaches. The effect of prejudice on black worker - black supervisor job stability is negative and significant
using only pre-2009 data. When we measure supervisor race using only the race of the first reported
supervisor, the effect is not statistically significant, though still negative and of similar magnitude to previous
results.
C.2 Alternative Measures of Prejudice
To test the sensitivity of our results to the individual components of our prejudice measure, in the first
five columns of Table C3 we estimate our fixed effect wage specification using the individual questions as
measures of prejudice directly. The columns use, in order, opposition to open housing laws, do not believe
blacks lag whites due to discrimination, believe that blacks lag whites due to lack of will, oppose the marriage
of a close relative to a black individual, and believe that blacks are lazy. The responses are scaled to be mean
0, standard deviation 1 across states, to ease comparison with the factor analysis results. Reassuringly, the
choice of question does not appear to be of great importance for our result. Black worker-black supervisor
wages are decreasing in prejudice for all of the questions we use to construct our measure, and significantly
so for all but the lazy question. The “supervisor race wage gap” for black workers is increasing in prejudice
for every question as well, and statistically significant for three out of the five questions.
In columns (6) through (9) we measure prejudice through four additional questions we did not use,
due to smaller samples and less dispersion in the data: support for anti-miscegenation laws, refusal to vote
for black presidential candidates, belief that blacks lag whites due to inborn disability, and a belief that
blacks are not intelligent. These questions yield similar conclusions. Our result on the supervisor race wage
gap is significant for 2 out of these 4 variables, while our result for black supervisor-black worker wages is
statistically significant for all four.
In Table C4, we repeat this exercise using the cross-sectional specification on job stability. Again, the
results are largely consistent across questions. We see that job stability is decreasing in prejudice for black
workers with black supervisors regardless of how we measure prejudice. While the result is not statistically
significant for the questions not used in our baseline measure, the magnitudes are only slightly smaller.
Taken together, while we cannot be certain under which questions our assumptions are satisfied, given
the general consistency of results, the results of Tables C3 and C4 suggest that if our assumptions hold for
any question in the GSS than our theory would likely be confirmed by a precise measure of state-wide rates
of employment prejudice. Moreover, nearly any way in which we construct a measure of prejudice from the
General Social Survey will yield results supportive of our model.
38
Figure 1: Model Timing Structure
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Figure 2: Effect of Black Supervisor on Black Job Stability - Alternative Durations
Point estimates and 95% confidence interval for estimate of γ5 + γ7 under different job length definitions of
job stability. Points were estimated at 30 day intervals. Regressions included controls for gender, education,
industry and occupation fixed effects, whether the employer offered health insurance, whether the employer
offered any benefits, union membership, and quartic terms in starting potential experience and ASVAB
percentile score.
40
Figure 3: Effect of Prejudice Black Supervisor-Black Worker Job Stability - Alternative
Durations
Point estimates and 95% confidence interval for estimate of γ5 + γ7 under different job length definitions of
job stability. Points were estimated at 30 day intervals. Regressions included controls for gender, education,
industry and occupation fixed effects, whether the employer offered health insurance, whether the employer
offered any benefits, union membership, and quartic terms in starting potential experience and ASVAB
percentile score.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Black Worker ASVAB Percentile Scores by Supervisor Race
Kernel density estimates of ASVAB percentile scores for black workers by supervisor race.
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Table 1: White Prejudice by Census Division
Census Division
Northeast Midwest South West
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Lack Will 0.43 0.48 0.54 0.49 0.58 0.64 0.58 0.44 0.43
No Discrimination 0.64 0.67 0.73 0.68 0.78 0.81 0.78 0.64 0.65
Oppose Marriage 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.48 0.35 0.18 0.16
Against Housing Laws 0.45 0.45 0.42 0.62 0.50 0.58 0.54 0.42 0.44
Lazy 0.32 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.43 0.48 0.44 0.32 0.33
Prejudice -1.00 -0.42 -0.12 -0.06 0.67 1.43 0.78 -0.96 -0.94
(0.55) (0.43) (0.30) (0.59) (0.94) (0.56) (0.69) (0.48) (0.12)
Observations 626 1754 2403 996 2378 830 1202 1032 1706
De-trended fraction of individuals in each region for the combined 1998-2010 wave of the General
Social Survey who reported each belief. Prejudice is first factor from principal factor analysis,
normalized to be mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across states. Standard deviations in parenthesis
See Appendix B for details of the data construction.
43
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Worker Race
(1) (2) (3)
Total White Black
Log Wage 7.24 7.30 7.12
(0.46) (0.46) (0.43)
Education 13.54 13.69 13.21
(2.44) (2.48) (2.32)
Female 0.47 0.45 0.51
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Potential Experience 4.80 4.64 5.15
(3.18) (3.14) (3.23)
Tenure 2.62 2.70 2.44
(2.23) (2.26) (2.15)
ASVAB 0.48 0.55 0.31
(0.28) (0.27) (0.24)
Black Supervisor 0.22 0.08 0.53
(0.42) (0.27) (0.50)
Against Housing Laws 0.47 0.47 0.48
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
No Discrimination 0.72 0.71 0.75
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Against Marriage 0.27 0.25 0.31
(0.11) (0.10) (0.13)
Lack Will 0.52 0.51 0.56
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Lazy 0.39 0.38 0.41
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Prejudice -0.02 -0.15 0.26
(0.84) (0.79) (0.86)
Observations 34123 22732 11391
Descriptive statistics by worker race. Each observation
is a job-year. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Observations are weighted by days they were worked in
that year. See Appendix B for description of prejudice
measures.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - Supervisor Race
(1) (2)
White Black
Log Wage 7.26 7.16
(0.45) (0.45)
Education 13.62 13.24
(2.46) (2.36)
Female 0.46 0.51
(0.50) (0.50)
Potential Experience 4.73 5.05
(3.16) (3.22)
Tenure 2.57 2.77
(2.19) (2.32)
ASVAB 0.51 0.36
(0.28) (0.27)
Black 0.20 0.76
(0.40) (0.43)
Against Housing Laws 0.47 0.48
(0.09) (0.09)
No Discrimination 0.71 0.75
(0.07) (0.08)
Against Marriage 0.26 0.31
(0.11) (0.13)
Lack Will 0.51 0.56
(0.08) (0.09)
Lazy 0.38 0.41
(0.06) (0.07)
Prejudice -0.09 0.23
(0.82) (0.85)
Observations 26636 7487
Descriptive statistics by supervisor race measure.
Each observation is a job-year. Standard deviations
in parenthesis. Observations are weighted by days
they were worked in that year. See Appendix B
for description of prejudice measures.
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Table 4: Racial Employment Matches and Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
Black -0.116*** -0.106*** -0.088*** -0.047***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Black Supervisor 0.028 0.029 0.014 0.009 0.033 0.029 0.014
(0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019)
Black X Black Supervisor -0.059** -0.058** -0.047** -0.046* -0.055** -0.051** -0.043*
(0.028) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023)
Worker Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
ASVAB Quartic No No No Yes No No No
Employer Characteristics No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Occupation FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Industry FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes
State FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 34123 34076 33519 27841 34123 34076 33519
Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the individual level. Worker characteristics in columns (1)-(4) include controls
for education, a gender dummy, and quartic terms in potential experience and tenure. Worker characteristics in columns (5)-(7)
include quartic terms in potential experience and tenure. Industry FE are 2-digit (2002) NAICS codes. Occupation FE are 2-digit
(2002) SOC codes. *p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 5: Prejudice and and Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
Black -0.092*** -0.097*** -0.079*** -0.035*
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018)
Black Supervisor 0.041** 0.034* 0.014 0.008 0.035 0.031 0.010
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
Black X Black Supervisor -0.060** -0.056** -0.039* -0.038 -0.052 -0.047 -0.030
(0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.035) (0.034) (0.029)
Prejudice -0.059*** -0.063** -0.051** -0.055** 0.002 -0.027 -0.017
(0.016) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.022) (0.021)
Prejudice X Black (γ5) -0.006 -0.004 -0.008 -0.015 -0.073** -0.067** -0.055*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Prejudice X Black Supervisor 0.013 0.017 0.003 -0.006 0.042* 0.042* 0.039*
(0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022)
Prejudice X Black X Black Supervisor (γ7) -0.018 -0.020 -0.017 -0.012 -0.052 -0.054 -0.059*
(0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.030)
γ5 + γ7 -0.024 -0.025 -0.025 -0.027 -0.125*** -0.120*** -0.114**
Worker Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
ASVAB Quartic No No No Yes No No No
Employer Characteristics No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Occupation FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Industry FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Census Division FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 31442 31442 30916 25642 31442 31442 30916
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. Worker characteristics in columns (1)-(4) include controls for education, a gender
dummy, and quartic terms in potential experience and tenure. Worker characteristics in column (5)-(7) include quartic terms in potential experience
and tenure. Industry FE are 2-digit (2002) NAICS codes. Occupation FE are 2-digit (2002) SOC codes. Significance stars on γ5 + γ7 represent p−level
on test of γ5 + γ7 = 0. *p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 6: Racial Employment Matches and Job Stability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable
Black -0.081*** -0.076*** -0.079*** -0.069***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
Black Supervisor 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.011 0.007 0.075** 0.071** 0.026
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
Black X Black Supervisor 0.049** 0.047* 0.068*** 0.061** 0.011 0.012 0.044
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039)
Worker Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
ASVAB Quartic No No No Yes No No No
Employer Characteristics No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Occupation FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Industry FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes
State FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 14125 14078 13740 11284 14125 14078 13740
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parenthesis. “Stable” is defined as a job lasting more than 1
year. Worker characteristics in columns (1)-(4) include controls for education, a gender dummy, and a quartic term in
starting potential experience. Worker characteristics in columns (5)-(7) include a quartic term in starting potential
experience. Industry FE are 2-digit (2002) NAICS codes. Occupation FE are 2-digit (2002) SOC codes. *p < .1, ** p < .05,
*** p < .01
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Table 7: Prejudice and Job Stability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable Stable
Black -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.080*** -0.069***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015)
Black Supervisor 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.004 -0.001 0.073*** 0.068*** 0.023
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) (0.026)
Black X Black Supervisor 0.057*** 0.051*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.016 0.014 0.049
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032)
Prejudice -0.007 -0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.032 0.009 0.004
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024) (0.029) (0.026)
Prejudice X Black (γ5) -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 0.002 -0.026 -0.044 -0.021
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
Prejudice X Black Supervisor 0.011 0.018 0.026 0.037 0.041 0.039 0.027
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028)
Prejudice X Black X Black Supervisor (γ7) -0.005 -0.012 -0.028 -0.042 -0.042 -0.033 -0.026
(0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
γ5 + γ7 -0.014 -0.015 -0.032 -0.040* -0.067 -0.077* -0.047
Worker Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
ASVAB Quartic No No No Yes No No No
Employer Characteristics No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Occupation FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Industry FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes
Census Division FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 13000 12981 12669 10394 13000 12981 12669
Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the individual level. “Stable” is defined as a job lasting more than 1 year. Worker
characteristics in columns (1)-(4) include a gender dummy, and quartic terms in starting potential experience. Worker characteristics in
column (5)-(7) include a quartic term in starting potential experience. Industry FE are 2-digit (2002) NAICS codes. Occupation FE are
2-digit (2002) SOC codes. Significance stars on γ5 + γ7 represent p−level on test of γ5 + γ7 = 0. *p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table 8: Within Job Spell Supervisor Race Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
Black Supervisor -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005
(0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
Black X Black Supervisor -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.014
(0.041) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038)
Prejudice X Black Supervisor 0.058 0.062
(0.054) (0.054)
Prejudice X Black X Black Supervisor -0.051 -0.053
(0.061) (0.060)
Job FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Characteristics No Yes No Yes
Occupation FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 23843 23657 21914 21734
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. Worker characteristics include
quartic terms in potential experience and tenure. Industry FE are 2-digit (2002) NAICS codes.
Occupation FE are 2-digit (2002) SOC codes. *p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table C1: Robustness to Supervisor Measure - Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-2009 First Supervisor Race Duration Control
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
Black Supervisor 0.015 0.010 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.005
(0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.019) (0.022)
Black X Black Supervisor -0.043* -0.031 -0.036 -0.031 -0.042* -0.030
(0.024) (0.030) (0.025) (0.036) (0.023) (0.029)
Prejudice -0.003 -0.011 -0.019
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Prejudice X Black (γ5) -0.046 -0.069** -0.055*
(0.032) (0.033) (0.029)
Prejudice X Black Supervisor 0.044* 0.025 0.039*
(0.022) (0.030) (0.020)
Prejudice X Black X Black Supervisor (γ7) -0.058* -0.043 -0.060**
(0.030) (0.037) (0.029)
γ5 + γ7 -0.104** -0.112** -0.115**
Worker Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Duration Quartic No No No No Yes Yes
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Census Division FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27152 25025 32558 29995 33553 30947
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in columns (1), (3), and (5), and clustered at the
state level in columns (2), (4), and (6). Column (1) and (2) use only observations before 2009 for both constructing the supervisor race
measure and estimating the equation. Columns (3) and (4) define a job spell as having a black supervisor if the first reported
supervisor is black. Columns (5) and (6) control for a quartic in total job duration. Worker characteristics include a quartic term in
starting potential experience. Industry FE are 2-digit (2002) NAICS codes. Occupation FE are 2-digit (2002) SOC codes. Significance
stars on γ5 + γ7 represent p−level on test of γ5 + γ7 = 0. *p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table C2: Robustness to Supervisor Measure - Job Stability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-2009 First Supervisor Race
Stable Stable Stable Stable
Black -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.059*** -0.062***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Black Supervisor 0.017 0.011 -0.066*** -0.068***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022)
Black X Black Supervisor 0.065*** 0.072*** 0.088*** 0.094***
(0.023) (0.016) (0.026) (0.023)
Prejudice 0.006 -0.001
(0.014) (0.013)
Prejudice X Black (γ5) -0.011 0.003
(0.017) (0.016)
Prejudice X Black Supervisor 0.037 0.032
(0.023) (0.032)
Prejudice X Black X Black Supervisor (γ7) -0.037 -0.040
(0.029) (0.044)
γ5 + γ7 -0.0476* -0.0371
Worker Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes No Yes No
Census Division FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12963 11962 13439 12380
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in
columns (1) and (3), and clustered at the state level in columns (2) and (4). Column (1) and (2)
use only observations before 2008 for both constructing the supervisor race measure and
estimating the equation. Columns (3) and (4) define a job spell as having a black supervisor if
the first reported supervisor is black. Worker characteristics include a gender dummy, and a
quartic term in starting potential experience. Industry FE are 2-digit (2002) NAICS codes.
Occupation FE are 2-digit (2002) SOC codes. Significance stars on γ5 + γ7 represent p−level
on test of γ5 + γ7 = 0. *p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
52
Table C3: Robustness to Different Prejudice Measures - Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
No Open No Disc Lack Will Marriage Lazy Misceg President Inborn Smart
Prejudice 0.015 0.003 -0.021 -0.053* -0.022 -0.022 0.015 0.012 -0.003
(0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015)
Prejudice X Black (γ5) -0.073*** -0.043* -0.022 -0.021 -0.002 -0.030 -0.088*** -0.016 -0.014
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027) (0.031) (0.018) (0.024) (0.021)
Prejudice X Black Supervisor 0.032 0.003 0.047** 0.034* 0.039 0.043** 0.038** 0.053*** 0.037*
(0.025) (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.026) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Prejudice X Black X Black Supervisor (γ7) -0.058** -0.015 -0.064** -0.048* -0.048 -0.056** -0.036 -0.053** -0.034
(0.028) (0.025) (0.029) (0.024) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.021) (0.022)
γ5 + γ7 -0.131*** -0.058* -0.086** -0.069* -0.049 -0.086** -0.124*** -0.069** -0.048*
Worker Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Division FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30916 33209 33209 33006 33209 32458 26085 33209 33209
Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parenthesis. Each column represents prejudice being measured as the fraction in the state who report the prejudiced
belief listed on the top. These are as follows: (1) Oppose open housing laws (2) Do not believe blacks lag whites due to discrimination (3) Believe blacks lag whites
due to lack of will (4) Oppose the marriage of a close relative to black individual (5) Believe that blacks are lazy (6) In favor of anti-miscegenation laws (7) Would not
vote for a black presidential candidate (8) Believe blacks lag whites due to inborn disability (9) Believe that blacks are not intelligent. Worker characteristics include
a quartic in starting potential experience. All columns control for race, supervisor race, and the interaction between race and supervisor race. Industry FE are 2-digit
(2002) NAICS codes. Occupation FE are 2-digit (2002) SOC codes. Significance stars on γ5 + γ7 represent p−level on test of γ5 + γ7 = 0. *p < .1, ** p < .05,
*** p < .01
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Table C4: Robustness to Different Prejudice Measures - Stability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
No Open No Disc Lack Will Marriage Lazy Misceg President Inborn Smart
Prejudice 0.031*** 0.006 -0.004 -0.024* 0.003 -0.012 -0.010 0.006 0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009)
Prejudice X Black (γ5) -0.009 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.016 0.004 0.002 0.012 -0.014
(0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) (0.022) (0.015)
Prejudice X Black Supervisor 0.013 0.032 0.046* 0.036 0.052** 0.046* 0.017 0.027 0.039
(0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.026) (0.017) (0.027) (0.026)
Prejudice X Black X Black Supervisor (γ7) -0.036 -0.050** -0.043 -0.034 -0.064* -0.040 -0.035 -0.032 -0.025
(0.032) (0.024) (0.032) (0.038) (0.032) (0.036) (0.024) (0.026) (0.033)
γ5 + γ7 -0.045* -0.039** -0.043* -0.028 -0.048* -0.036 -0.034 -0.020 -0.039
Worker Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ASVAB Quartic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Division FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10394 11173 11173 11092 11173 10913 8662 11173 11173
Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parenthesis. Each column represents prejudice being measured as the fraction in the state who report the prejudiced
belief listed on the top. These are as follows: (1) Oppose open housing laws (2) Do not believe blacks lag whites due to discrimination (3) Believe blacks lag whites
due to lack of will (4) Oppose the marriage of a close relative to black individual (5) Believe that blacks are lazy (6) In favor of anti-miscegenation laws (7) Would not
vote for a black presidential candidate (8) Believe blacks lag whites due to inborn disability (9) Believe that blacks are not intelligent. Worker characteristics include
a quartic in starting potential experience. All columns control for race, supervisor race, and the interaction between race and supervisor race. Industry FE are 2-digit
(2002) NAICS codes. Occupation FE are 2-digit (2002) SOC codes. Significance stars on γ5 + γ7 represent p−level on test of γ5 + γ7 = 0. *p < .1, ** p < .05,
*** p < .01.
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